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Abstract 
 
Corruption is likely to be widespread during the early stages of capitalist development when 
capitalists enjoy low legitimacy and states face excess demand for the rights and resources 
they allocate. Yet the economic effects of corruption have differed greatly across Asian 
countries. The paper argues that the differential economic performance of developers is 
related to the types of patron-client networks within which their corruption has been located. 
The type of patron-client network determines the types of rights exchanged through 
corruption and the terms of these exchanges. The article compares patron-client networks in 
the Indian subcontinent, Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea. Such an examination helps to 
explain why in some countries corruption has attended rapid growth while in others it has 
implied transfers which are very damaging for growth. This provides a more nuanced 
understanding of the causes and effects of corruption which must precede the construction 
of appropriate institutional and political responses. 
 
PATRON-CLIENT NETWORKS AND  
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION IN ASIA 
Mushtaq H. Khan1. 
 
Corruption has been associated with very different economic effects across Asian countries. 
In some North East Asian countries such as South Korea, widespread corruption has 
accompanied decades of very high growth. In others, such as the South Asian countries of 
the Indian subcontinent, corruption has been associated with relatively low growth. In a third 
group of countries in South East Asia, high levels of corruption have been associated with 
moderately high long-run growth rates. These differences could be the result of differences in 
underlying rates of growth. On the other hand they could also be the result of corruption 
having differential effects across countries (while their underlying growth rates can, of 
course, vary as well). Economic theory has identified a number of factors which could 
explain differences in the economic effects of corruption. However economic explanations 
have given little attention to differences in the political power of the groups competing for 
resources allocated by the state. This paper argues that the distribution of political power is 
revealed in differences in the structure of patron-client networks across countries and these 
can be important for explaining the differential effects of corruption. The bargaining power of 
patrons and clients can explain differences in the rights and resources which they exchange 
(often in corrupt transactions). This in turn can contribute to our understanding of the 
differential effects of corruption. We will examine the patron-client networks linking states 
and competing groups of clients in the Indian subcontinent, Malaysia, Thailand and South 
Korea and investigate the ways in which the structure of these networks can determine the 
economic effects associated with corruption in those countries. 
 
Section 1 explains the structural pressures resulting in significant degrees of corruption in 
virtually every developing country. One reason why it has been difficult to allocate resources 
in developing countries in ways which are always strictly legal is that for a wide range of 
critical rights any state allocation would be perceived to be illegitimate. Economic 
development is characterised by the creation of new wealth-owning classes. The rights 
which underpin the emergence of these classes are by definition new and not widely 
perceived to be legitimate. The underlying problem of course is that in developing countries 
the result of these early developmental allocations are widely and correctly perceived to 
have consequences for generations to come when new classes stabilise. As a result many 
decisions made by states concerning the allocation of these  critical rights cannot easily be 
made through strictly legal frameworks simply because a transparent allocative rule is often 
impossible to agree on. Thus even in countries where rapid growth takes place, there has 
been a tendency for state allocations to be not fully exposed to public scrutiny and so 
susceptible to corruption. The interesting question is why some countries were more 
effective in generating growth despite these problems while in others wealth was transferred 
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to relatively unproductive groups. Section 2 summarises a number of explanation offered by 
economists and develops one which has not received much attention: the relative political 
power of the different groups of clients demanding rights (and resources) from patrons in the 
state.  
 
Section 3 compares several key differences in the patron-client networks in a number of 
Asian countries to show how differences in the distribution of power implicit in these 
networks may explain differences in the types of rights created and allocated by the state 
and thereby differences in their economic performance. In the South Asian countries of the 
Indian subcontinent, the patron-client networks reveal the substantial political power of 
clients from intermediate “non-capitalist” classes. Attempts to accommodate the demands of 
these intermediate classes has resulted in interlocked patron-client transactions involving 
bureaucrats and politicians on the one hand and capitalists and non-capitalist clients on the 
other. These interlocked exchanges have meant that the rights created or allocated by the 
state became locked into enmeshed networks and were not easy to subsequently re-
allocate. This in turn resulted in structural sclerosis. In contrast, in South Korea, patron-
client exchanges were almost entirely insulated from the demands of intermediate classes 
because of the historical weakness of intermediate classes in that country. Politicians and 
through them the bureaucrats allocating new rights to capitalists could extract substantial 
payoffs from industrial groups. But here the networks through which these exchanges were 
organised allowed the re-allocation of these rights. This in turn created strong incentives for 
the state to re-allocate rights and resources in ways which maximised long-run growth.  
 
South-East Asian countries present a number of interesting variants which in different ways 
resulted in more dynamic economies than in South Asia despite the presence of large 
intermediate classes and more complex patterns of patron-client exchanges than in South 
Korea. Malaysia inherited a large class of individuals whose demands could potentially have 
resulted in patron-client exchanges of the Indian variety. However, in Malaysia the clear 
ethnic division between intermediate classes who were largely Malay and a capitalist class 
which was initially largely Chinese paradoxically allowed the construction of a structure of 
patron-client exchanges which allowed fairly rapid growth. Instead of many decentralised 
patron-client exchanges between many different patrons and groups of clients, the ethnic 
redistribution adopted by the New Economic Policy in the seventies allowed a centralised 
sharing of rents in Malaysia. This served to prevent structural sclerosis from developing 
along Indian lines.  
 
Thailand provides yet another South-East Asian variant. Here Chinese capitalists were well-
integrated into local political elites and an ethnic-based patronage politics along Malaysian 
lines did not emerge. Instead, the relatively well developed capitalist class took over 
patronage networks themselves. They became the patrons “buying off” the demands of 
potential clients from amongst the aspiring intermediate classes and using this political power 
to bargain for resource allocation to their particular faction. The role of capitalists in Thai 
politics is apparent in the exceptionally large number of capitalists (by developing country 
standards) involved in Thai electoral politics. Here we have yet another structure of patron-
client exchanges which allowed a relatively decentralised type of capitalism to thrive. These 
explorations suggest how the location of corrupt transactions within specific structures of 
patron-client exchanges can help to make sense of differential economic performance. 
 
It may be utopian to believe that the transition to capitalism can be entirely just. Yet unless 
the transition process is widely perceived to be just, it is difficult for it to be organised in a 
legally regulated way in an open polity. External pressure to tackle corruption may help 
development only if such pressure contributes to the legitimisation of the processes through 
which capitalism is being created. On the other hand, it is very likely that anti-corruption 
strategies may sometimes make the problem of organising internal political stability more 
difficult during processes of capitalist transition which could in turn prolong instability and the 
perpetuation of underdevelopment. The issue of corruption thus brings to the fore the limits 
of attempts to establish high standards of justice in the transition to capitalism in the absence 
of any global political commitment to equitably share the costs of structural change. 
 
1. Corruption in Developing Countries 
It is not very useful to quibble over formal definitions of corruption. Most usually corruption 
is defined as the violation of the formal rules governing the allocation of public resources by 
officials in response to offers of financial gain or political support [Nye 1967, Khan 1996b]. 
However it is defined, corruption appears to be endemic in developing countries and indeed 
there are systematic reasons why this should be the case. Accumulation and the allocation of 
public resources in developing countries very frequently involves changes in established 
property rights and institutions or the creation of entirely new ones. To put it simply, the state 
is allocating rights and resources at a time when a new capitalist class is emerging. Given the 
long-run and even inter-generational consequences of these allocations, there are huge 
incentives to dispute, contest and attempt to change all such allocations.  
 
For these processes not to involve corruption, the allocation and creation of these new 
rights would have to follow strict rules so that particular individuals could not change these 
allocations by bribing. The problem is that any such rules would themselves have to be 
publicly set up. Given the post-colonial political settlement in most developing countries, it is 
unlikely that explicit rules which aim to create new capitalist classes could be set up in such a 
way as to enjoy widespread legitimacy. If we recognise that what is happening in developing 
countries is the creation of new classes by the allocation and stabilisation of new rights, it is 
easy to appreciate the substantial difficulties in following a transparent and accountable route 
to the construction of capitalism even if developing country leaders had always been minded 
to follow such a route. 
 
Suppose we were to try to construct a set of transparent and legitimate rules through which 
capitalist property rights were to be created. On the one hand, the supply of the resources 
through which the emergence of the new class is being encouraged is severely limited in 
developing countries. This is a manifestation of underdevelopment and poverty. On the other 
hand, there is likely to be a very great demand for access to these resources so that 
particular individuals can join this emerging class. Anti-colonial struggles mobilised large 
multi-class populist alliances in many developing countries and post-colonial states could not 
explicitly formulate rules of allocation which appeared to leave any of these groups out of the 
contest. Constitutions and laws enshrined principles of allocation which were egalitarian and 
fair at a time when underlying resource constraints made following such principles extremely 
difficult. The large gap between demand and supply has often meant that the actual 
allocation of property rights often failed the principles of allocation which the law set out. 
Very great incentives were created for corruption. This was as true for the allocation of land, 
credit or licenses to emerging industrialists as for the allocation of irrigation water or credit to 
emerging capitalist farmers.  
 
The contest over public resources is particularly severe because the early beneficiaries of 
these contests are winners in a game of class evolution which is likely to have consequences 
for generations to come. In many cases, the individuals who succeed in establishing 
themselves at this critical stage only do so as a result of a great deal of good fortune, political 
connections, some initial wealth or corruption. None of these characteristics can legitimise 
the large differences in income and wealth which subsequently emerge. Given the inherent 
unfairness involved in these processes it has been relatively easy to organise opposition to 
these characteristics of the development processes in most developing countries. Opposition 
has typically been organised by members of emerging middle class groups who have been 
left behind in the development process and is therefore more intense in societies where these 
groups are better organised and entrenched.  
 
Paradoxically, the opposition of these groups has often resulted in a second set of structural 
pressures generating high levels of corruption in developing countries. The opposition of 
organised groups has often had to be bought off by payoffs from existing elites or directly 
from the state to the most troublesome or vociferous opponents in an attempt to “purchase” 
support or legitimacy. This type of corruption is more overtly political in motivation as 
opposed to the corruption which results from the excess demand for publicly allocated 
resources and rights. Here the state allocates resources to those with the greatest ability to 
create political problems rather than to those who have the greatest ability to pay (see Khan 
1996a for a discussion of the significance of the distinction). Political corruption too results in 
surreptitious transfers because (in most cases) payoffs to opponents in proportion to their 
ability to make trouble could not by its nature be publicly recorded in the budget. 
 
This is the general background against which we need to examine the evolution of patterns 
of corruption in Asian countries. The approach in this paper will be to locate the processes 
of corruption in the context of the very different routes through which classes and property 
rights have been evolving in developing countries. We argue that by so doing we are better 
able to account for the differences in the apparent effects of corruption across countries. The 
processes of accumulation have been quite different across Asia. The rights which were 
being created for emerging capitalist classes and the terms under which these rights were 
being created differed greatly. Since the social utility of property rights depends quite a lot 
on which rights are created and the terms of their creation it is not surprising that the 
processes of corruption in these countries were associated with a very wide range of 
economic performance. To say this is not to justify corruption even under those conditions 
where it was associated with rapid growth. Rather it is to point out that corruption can have 
much more damaging effects in contexts where it is associated with growth-retarding 
patterns of accumulation. It is also to point out that corruption is often integrally linked with 
the political processes through which capitalism is being constructed rather than simply being 
an excrescence which can be easily excised.  
 
The literature on corruption has been concerned from the outset with whether corruption 
was beneficial or harmful and under what circumstances. However, the circumstances were 
typically so broadly defined that in effect competing models appeared to show that 
corruption was likely to be either generally harmful or generally beneficial. For instance, in an 
early contribution Leff [1964] argued that corruption was likely to have beneficial effects in 
developing countries suffering from restrictive private monopolies and state intervention. By 
allowing entrepreneurs to side-step restrictive rules, Leff argued that corruption could result 
in more efficient resource allocation. Since virtually every developing country could be 
described as having restrictive rules in key sectors as well as private monopolies, Leff’s 
argument suggests that corruption could be generally beneficial in a large number of 
countries. In fact, in the African countries Leff was particularly interested in, the beneficial 
effects of corruption were least in evidence.  
 
In contrast, Myrdal [1968] argued that the possibility of corruption may induce bureaucrats 
to deliberately introduce legislation which created new obstacles. Myrdal’s argument 
anticipated some of the rent-seeking literature to come in the seventies and eighties. Since 
bureaucrats can always create new possibilities of extracting bribes by creating new 
restrictions, Myrdal, and the rent-seeking literature generally is suspicious of any corruption. 
This type of argument suggests that in general corruption signals harmful rent-seeking by 
state officials who have deliberately created value-reducing restrictions whose effects leave 
society worse off. This approach too cannot do justice to the widespread evidence of 
substantial corruption in many developing countries which enjoyed high rates of growth. 
Indeed historical evidence suggests the presence of widespread corruption in the currently 
advanced countries at an earlier stage of their development. The gradual reduction of 
corruption in the successful developers may have been the result rather than the 
precondition of successful development. 
 
Clearly we need to have an analytical framework which allows corruption to have different 
effects in different countries. If indeed corruption has a uniform effect (whether good or bad) 
everywhere, this should be the conclusion reached at the end of a process of evaluation and 
analysis rather than a presumption made at the outset. If on the other hand, corruption can 
have variable effects, identifying these differences could be of great policy importance. Even 
if all corruption is equally undesirable on moral grounds, the differences between them in 
terms of their economic effects may inform the direction of policy and institutional attention. 
Two sets of observations constitute the starting point of our enquiry: i) the association of 
corruption with poor performance in the South Asian countries and ii) the comparatively 
much better performance of East and South-East Asian countries despite the prevalence of 
substantial corruption there.  
 
Informal journalistic evidence suggests that corruption has been widespread in virtually all 
developing countries. This view is corroborated by the subjective responses of foreigners 
who have done business in these countries. These responses are summarised in the Business 
International corruption index which is reported in Table 1 for our sample of countries for 
the period 1980-83. Table 1 shows that for this group of countries, the extent of corruption 
correlates very poorly with economic performance. The differences between subjective 
corruption indices ranging from 6 to 4 are not necessarily significant but the table does 
suggest that over the relevant period, very corrupt Thailand did not perform significantly 
worse than apparently less corrupt South Korea and probably better than less corrupt and 
more resource-rich Malaysia. As a group, these countries combined good performance with 
high levels of corruption. The South Asian countries fit more closely with the perception that 
corruption is associated with poor performance. But even here, more corrupt Pakistan 
appears to have performed somewhat better than less corrupt India. 
 
COUNTRY CORRUPTION GDP Growth Rates
INDEX 1980-83                    1970-80 1980-92
                                             (10 = No Corruption, 
                                         0 = Maximum Corruption)
   Malaysia 6    7.9    5.9
South Korea 5.7    9.6    9.4
     India 5.25    3.4    5.2
  Pakistan 4    4.9    6.1
Bangladesh 4    2.3    4.2
 Thailand 1.5    7.1    8.2
Source: Mauro [1995], World Development Report [1994].
Table 1 Corruption and Economic Performance
 
Some of these differences in performance between these countries may be accounted for by 
variations in economic variables such as investment rates. However, we will concentrate on 
factors which may explain why corruption is itself associated with differential effects across 
countries. 
 
2. Some Determinants of the Effects of Corruption. 
The overall economic effect of corruption can be broken down into two components. The 
first is the economic effect of the bribe. The resources transferred in the bribe itself often 
results in a reduction in social value and is therefore an economic cost for society. In theory, 
however, bribes could be pure transfers which simply redistribute wealth but keep total 
wealth unchanged. In this rare case the bribe itself may be costless for society. In the more 
usual case, bribes from industrialists or other social actors to state officials represent a social 
cost of variable magnitude as social wealth is reduced to a greater or lesser extent. This is 
typically the case if the bribe-giver would otherwise have invested the bribe in production 
whereas the transfer to the official typically results in consumption with possible value-
reduction for the economy over time. This is the first effect of corruption which is the effect 
of the flow of resources from social actors to state officials shown by the higher arrow in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The Two Economic Effects of Corruption 
 
The second effect of corruption is the economic consequence of the new rights or 
reallocations of rights brought about by state officials as the quid pro quo of the bribes they 
have received. This is the effect of the rights created or transferred by state officials in 
response to the bribe which is shown by the lower arrow in Figure 1. This part of the 
analysis is much more complicated as it is not always the case that the changes brought 
about as a result of or in association with corruption are always value reducing for society 
(Leff’s argument was a simple version of the value-enhancing possibility). There is also a 
problem of choosing the benchmark quite carefully (the structure and allocation of rights 
which would have existed in the absence of corruption) to judge this effect correctly [Khan 
1996b]. Clearly Figure 1 is a simplification of the possibly complex flows of bribes and 
payoffs from social actors to state officials on the one hand and flows of rights, subsidies and 
allocations of public resources from officials to social actors on the other. We examine some 
of these complexities in greater detail later. 
 
The overall effect of corruption is the joint effect of the direct implications of the bribe and 
the effect of the rights created or transferred as a result. Differential effects across countries 
can be due to differences in either or both of these effects [Khan 1997]. In some cases 
corruption may be damaging mainly because the bribes are large or may have particularly 
damaging effects on the economy because of lost  opportunities for investors or the use 
made of the bribes by recipients. In other cases the significant negative effect of corruption 
may be due to the types of rights created, who they are created for and the terms under 
which they are created. The patron-client networks which we will concentrate on in this 
Social
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article have implications for the effects of corruption particularly because of their role in 
determining the second effect, that is in determining the types of rights which are created or 
transferred through corrupt transactions.  
 
Patron-client networks describe a set of transactions which may overlap with and yet are 
analytically distinct from corruption. Patron-client relationships are repeated relationships of 
exchange between specific patrons and their clients. A number of features distinguish 
patron-client exchanges from other types of exchange. First, such exchanges are usually 
personalised. They involve an identifiable patron and an identifiable set of clients. Entry and 
exit is considerably less free compared to normal market transactions. Secondly, the 
exchange is between two distinct types of agents, distinguished by status, power or other 
characteristics [Schmidt et. al. 1977 in particular Landé: xiii-xxxvii]. Typically the superior 
member is the patron and the inferior member the client. Clearly a wide range of exchanges 
in developing countries between state officials and privileged groups of clients can be 
described in these terms. Nevertheless, the power or status of the patron can vary across a 
broad range and these differences may be important for understanding the types of 
exchanges taking place within different patron-client networks [Khan 1996a,b]. It is this 
insight which makes patron-client networks interesting for the study of corruption. The type 
of network can give us critical additional information about the types of rights being 
transacted and the terms on which these transactions take place. Some characteristics of 
patrons and clients which are likely to influence the economic implications of the transactions 
are easily dealt with by economists, others are less simple to model.  
 
i) Objectives and Ideologies: Economists normally assume that actors in state and society 
will want to maximise value for themselves. At the very least, they will want to maximise 
value for someone. In fact both state officials and social actors may be motivated by ends 
which are primarily non-economic such as race or ethnicity. To the extent that transactions 
between patrons and clients reflect such non-economic goals, economic value may 
obviously not be maximised [North 1981, 1995].  
 
The objectives of state officials and social actors determine their goals while their ideologies 
(shared assumptions about how the world works) influence the ways in which they attempt 
to achieve them. Exchanges within patron-client networks can only be value-maximising if 
the partners to the exchange want to achieve value maximisation for themselves or at least 
for others. It is not necessary that they be totally motivated by value maximisation as long as 
a substantial part of decision-making is motivated by it. If transactions are value-maximising 
for individuals they may also, under certain conditions, be value-maximising for society. On 
the other hand, transactions which are not even value-maximising for the transactors are very 
unlikely to be value-maximising for society. Apart from being motivated (to a large extent at 
least) by economic value-maximisation, it is also necessary that the participants have 
ideologies which enable them to learn rapidly so that they do not hold on to beliefs about 
causes and effects which do not stand up to repeated experience. North [1995] has recently 
stressed the importance of ideologies and learning processes in explaining differences in 
performance across countries. Ideologies could therefore have some role to play in 
explaining why both corrupt and non-corrupt transactions within patron-client networks may 
differ across countries. While ideologies and learning processes may be important it is likely 
that their importance has been exaggerated in some recent work [Khan 1995: 79-85]. 
 
ii) Numbers of Clients: The numbers of potential clients of each type can affect their 
success in organising collective action in bargaining with patrons. If small groups with 
specific interests are more successful in organising collective action, they may bribe or lobby 
more effectively than bigger groups and indeed the rest of society [Olson 1965, 1982]. This 
could result in rights being created to favour small groups even when they are value-reducing 
for society as a whole. However, small numbers are only part of the story. In most 
developing countries, resources have to be directed to and rights created for small numbers 
of emerging “capitalists”. But in fact their expected advantage in lobbying or bribing due to 
their small numbers is often over-ridden by the bargaining power of other groups such as the 
urban middle classes or rich peasants whose power is often based on their large numbers. 
Thus while numbers are important, their effect on bargaining power is more complicated 
than is suggested by the simplest interpretations of Olson’s model. 
 
iii) The Homogeneity of Clients: This too may determine the chances of successful 
collective action by different groups of clients. More importantly, the homogeneity or 
otherwise of particular groups may determine the relative transaction costs facing state 
officials or political patrons in collecting bribes from that group. If some clients are relatively 
easy to transact with (say because they are of the same ethnic group as the patrons), the 
latter may prefer to deal with them even if others may notionally have been willing to pay 
more. Thus for instance the relative homogeneity of small groups demanding value-reducing 
rights may be successful while less homogenous larger groups demanding value-enhancing 
rights may fail. The relative transaction costs of dealing with different groups of clients may 
be relevant for explaining some outcomes of patron-client exchanges in developing countries 
[Khan 1997]. 
 
iv) The Institutions through which Patrons and Clients Interact: These include in 
particular the institutions of the state through which patrons and clients negotiate and carry 
out exchanges. Institutions can influence both the “demand” for new rights (the flow of 
bribes to state officials) as well as influencing the “supply” of rights (the flows of rights from 
patrons to those offering bribes). On the demand side, institutions may allow or prevent 
particular groups of clients to compete for new rights or resources. They also describe the 
rules of the game which define how clients who bribe can expect their chances of winning to 
change as a result. These institutional features determine the magnitude of the bribes offered 
by particular groups of clients demanding particular rights or re-allocations of rights [Mueller 
1989: 229-235]. On the supply side, the degree of fragmentation of institutions may 
determine how easy it is for different patrons to coordinate their transactions. A failure to 
coordinate may sometimes result in lower valued rights being created even though patrons 
might collectively have extracted bigger bribes by collectively creating higher valued rights 
[Rose-Ackerman 1978, Shleifer & Vishny 1993]. Institutional structures can thus play an 
important role in determining the outcomes of patron-client exchanges. 
 
v) The Relative Political Power of Patrons and Clients: The potential role of relative 
political power in determining the types of rights transacted between patrons and clients has 
not been adequately recognised in the literature. The relative political power of clients 
determines the type of payoff they can offer to the patron. If clients are politically weak, the 
patron is likely to extract the maximum economic payoff from the client in the form of a 
bribe commensurate with the right being created or transferred. At the other extreme, if the 
patron is politically weak, the client may instead be offering political support rather than an 
economic payoff. The payoff to the patron in this case is not just the value of the bribe paid 
to state officials and politicians but also the political support (or absence of political 
opposition) which is often also offered [Khan 1996a, 1996b]. We argue that a critical factor 
determining differences in the rights which are transacted between patrons and clients in 
different settings is the relative power of competing groups of clients and their patrons in the 
state. 
 
One reason why political power has received little attention from economists is that it is 
relatively difficult to define. Steven Lukes distinguished between power defined as a 
collective capacity which he called power1 and power defined as an asymmetric 
relationship between individuals or groups which he called power2 [Lukes 1978: 636]. The 
first type of power is relevant when we want to discuss power as a transformative capacity. 
However, for our purposes, the relevant notion of power is power2 in Lukes’ terminology. 
Power2 determines whether clients are able to bargain a more or less attractive deal with 
their patrons. Udehn [1996: 150] suggests an even narrower version of power2 which he 
calls power3 which he defines as the capacity of some actors to reward and/or punish other 
actors. Power3 and its determinants may be most relevant for looking at differential 
bargaining outcomes within patron-client networks. The determinants of power3 determine 
the extent to which clients are able to inflict political costs on patrons if they are ignored. The 
greater the power of clients in terms of the second and third definitions, the more likely is it 
that patrons will be offering powerful groups of clients rights in exchange for political support 
rather than economic payoffs.  
 
Differences in the power of specific groups of clients across countries may then be important 
for understanding differences in the bargains they are able to strike with their patrons. It may 
determine whether patrons are primarily motivated by economic or political considerations 
when negotiating with clients. When clients lack political power in the form of power3, 
patrons can focus on economic considerations alone. Other things being equal (the factors 
discussed earlier), a patron allocating a right will prefer to allocate or create rights for clients 
who add the most value. This is because these clients will in principle be able to offer the 
biggest bribes. In contrast when clients have the power to disrupt or otherwise impose 
political costs on patrons, purely economic considerations are not enough. We have 
elsewhere described the costs which clients can threaten to impose as transition costs 
[Khan 1995: 81-83]. To avoid these costs, rights may be created for or allocated to clients 
on the basis of their relative power to disrupt. Thus this type of power may have implications 
for the rights which are created through patron-client transactions including those involving 
corruption. 
3. Corruption and Power in Patron-Client Networks. 
Exchanges within patron-client networks are in reality much more complex than the neat 
bilateral exchanges shown in Figure 1. While some of these complexities may be usefully 
abstracted from, others are critically important for picking up economically relevant 
differences in a comparative analysis. In particular, the position of different types of clients 
and actors within the state and their bargaining relationships need to be identified even if in a 
highly simplified way in different contexts. Nevertheless, the basic format of the implicit 
exchanges outlined in Figure 1 can still be used to keep track of what is going on in 
transactions involving several groups of patrons and clients.  
 
In what follows, we identify what we think are several key features of exchanges within 
patron-client networks in several Asian countries. The characteristics identified are based on 
the work of political scientists and political economists and refer to exchanges which may be 
described as typical of those countries without suggesting that these are the only types of 
patron-client exchanges occurring. We then identify why these patterns may be relevant for 
understanding the economic performance of these countries, and therefore the economic 
consequences of the associated corruptions. 
 
i) South Asia. Despite important differences between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh there 
are substantial similarities in the predominant types of corruption observed in these three 
populous South Asian countries. The basic patterns of subcontinental corruption were 
described by Wade in his classic studies of corruption in the irrigation bureaucracy of a 
South Indian state [Wade 1984, 1985, 1989]. The distinguishing characteristic of corruption 
in the Indian subcontinent is the close intermeshing of economic and political calculations in 
exchanges between patrons and clients at different levels.  
 
A number of factors have contributed to the evolution of complex networks of interlinked 
exchanges in the Indian subcontinent. The factor which is probably the single most important 
one for the exchanges which concern us is the political importance of intermediate classes in 
the Indian social structure. Important groups of clients in the Indian subcontinent have been 
drawn from these intermediate or “middle” classes. Often the professional members of these 
groups have been recognised as equal members of the dominant class coalition in India, 
along with capitalists and landlords [Bardhan 1984]. However, for our purposes it is useful 
to distinguish between the capitalist members of the dominant coalition and the much larger 
non-capitalist section which consists of emerging middle class groups, the educated sections 
of the population, both employed and unemployed and others who use political power to get 
access to resources. The importance of these non-capitalist intermediate classes in the 
subcontinental political space far outweighs their numbers which in any case would run into 
many millions.  
 
The relevant power of this latter group is very largely the third type of power discussed 
earlier. It is a power which is based fundamentally on their organisational and political ability 
to disrupt and challenge the legitimacy of patrons who fail to deliver [Khan 1989]. This is 
reflected in a state tradition of rapid and ongoing accommodation and incorporation of 
emerging intermediate groups even while fairly ruthless suppression appears to be taking 
place. One of the most important mechanisms of incorporation is the transfer of surpluses to 
these classes through patron-client exchanges, some of which are perfectly legal (such as 
subsidies) while others are corrupt and involve illegal transfers of resources or the transfer of 
resources which were illegally generated.  
 
Both Pakistan and India and subsequently Bangladesh inherited the effects of a deep-rooted 
anti-colonial political mobilisation which empowered their emerging “middle classes”. They 
inherited a tradition of political activity on the basis of a wide variety of emotive symbols 
including language, caste and religion and these patterns of mobilisation were widely 
accepted as legitimate in the post-colonial society. Politics based on these symbols has not 
enriched the vast majority of the populations of these countries but has enabled successive 
layers of emerging middle class groups to get access to public resources on the basis of their 
ability to organise much more numerous groups below them. Those amongst the 
intermediate classes who happened to be in power found it necessary to organise transfers 
to the most vociferous of the excluded groups in ongoing processes of accommodation and 
incorporation.  
 
What is important is that a large part of the transfer (whether legal or illegal) from patrons to 
intermediate classes of clients has been based on the political bargaining power of these 
pyramidally organised groups of clients. These transfers in turn have had to be financed and 
patrons had to find the resources for such transfers either in general taxation or through 
exchanges with other groups of clients. The inadequacy of general fiscal resources is an 
important part of the reason why we observe a complex intermeshing of political and 
economic exchanges in patron-client networks in the Indian subcontinent. Political elites 
have often found the resources with which they “finance” their political survival in their 
economic exchanges with other groups of clients, in particular the slowly emerging class of 
industrial capitalists. This is an important factor explaining the dense structure of interlinked 
economic and political exchanges which Wade identified but did not adequately explain. 
Political “corruption” led to economic corruption as each group of politicians organised their 
own networks of resource collection and distribution. 
 
The interlocked networks based around each political faction in turn have had important 
implications for the rights which are created or allocated to capitalists and which in turn have 
implications for long-run performance. Capitalists too are rational political actors and in a 
context where no political actor or bureaucrat is able to operate without satisfying their 
constituencies, it has been relatively easy for capitalists to ensure that they too were funding 
powerful constituencies so that their interest in leading the easy life could not be challenged. 
As a result, the politicians and bureaucrats who have organised their political survival 
through such localised arrangements are often unable to change the structure or allocation of 
rights to capitalists even when this would raise value. The difficulty of changing the structure 
of rights because of such interlinked patron-client exchanges thus serves to block structural 
change and productivity growth when growth requires the creation of new rights or the re-
allocation or alteration of existing rights. 
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Figure 2 Flows within Patron-Client Networks in the Indian Subcontinent 
 
Figure 2 shows the potential complexity of the flows of resources between patrons and 
clients in the political context typical of most South Asian countries. Bureaucrats and 
politicians constitute two parallel hierarchies and at each level bureaucrats or politicians may 
be patrons for lower level colleagues or for groups elsewhere in society. For simplicity 
Figure 2 only distinguishes between two social groups, the capitalist and non-capitalist 
clients of the state, the latter being the intermediate classes discussed earlier. The most 
successful non-capitalist clients often become political leaders or even capitalists over time. 
The most distinctive feature of these patron-client exchanges are the transfers going from 
politicians at different levels to different groups of non-capitalist clients. The quid pro quo 
from these clients to the state is not shown in Figure 2 because it is typically not an economic 
payoff but rather a “payoff” in the form of political quiescence or support. 
 
The resources for the economic payoffs to the intermediate classes come from the rest of 
society in the form of taxes or transfers from other groups of clients. If we look at the nodes 
representing the “capitalist” clients of the state, we see a number of transfers going the other 
way, this time from these clients to patrons in the bureaucracy and in the political structure. 
Emerging capitalists are willing to make these transfers to politicians and bureaucrats 
because they too are often receiving subsidies, allocations of valuable property rights or at 
the very least the protection of their property rights. Emerging capitalists in both India and 
Pakistan have received large subsidies and were allocated scarce resources such as land, 
credit and foreign exchange on a preferential basis. This was justified by the claim that these 
were transfers which would induce industrialisation or agricultural growth which in turn was 
perceived by the respective states as essential for the survival of the economy and of their 
country’s sovereignty. The kickbacks from industrialists have in turn been an important 
source of finance for the political survival strategies of subcontinental politicians. 
 
While the networks of corruption and political payoffs in India have often been commented 
on, the economic implications of these complex networks has not been analysed. An 
important consequence was that allocations of rights and subsidies which were to create a 
new capitalist class rapidly got embroiled in the networks of transfers which maintained 
political stability. As a result, any particular allocation proved very difficult to change once it 
had become established as change provoked opposition from many different quarters. 
Economic allocations to particular capitalists were soon difficult to separate from the political 
payoffs to the non-capitalist clients who had been accommodated through interlocking 
transfers. The eventual result was the emergence of persistent subsidies for poorly 
performing industries and sectors which were difficult to change in response to performance 
failures or changes in technology and markets.  
 
This result was common to both India and Pakistan in the sixties and beyond despite the 
institutional and policy differences between Nehru’s Five Year Plans and Ayub’s 
authoritarian industrial policy. Declining economic performance combined with a sustained 
growth in political demands from emerging middle classes led to dramatic political crises in 
the Indian subcontinent. These twin features characterised the dismemberment of Pakistan in 
1971, ethnic violence in post-1971 Pakistan, deep-seated political instability in Bangladesh 
and the growth of centrifugal political  forces in India as linguistic and regional forces 
gathered strength in the seventies and eighties. 
 
ii) South Korea. The revelations of corruption in South Korea which have begun to emerge 
in the nineties suggests that corruption in North East Asia has probably been as extensive in 
terms of the relative magnitudes of the transfers as it has been in South Asia. On the other 
hand, the pattern of resource flows appears to be both different and simpler. This seems to 
have been particularly the case in the early days of industrial policy in the sixties [Kim 1994: 
59-70, Kong 1996]. There is evidence, however, that political power has become more 
dispersed over the eighties resulting in more complex patterns of transfers [Ravenhill 1997]. 
The broad features of the South Korean case suggest a much higher degree of concentration 
of political power which allowed the political executive to extract rents from beneficiaries of 
new rights without having to make political side-payments to non-capitalist clients to 
anything like the extent which we observe in South Asia. 
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Figure 3 Flows within Patron-Client Networks in South Korea 
 
 
Figure 3 is a simplified picture of resource flows within patron-client networks in South 
Korea. Given the lesser importance of non-capitalist clients of the state in this case, we 
simplify by excluding non-capitalist clients from the figure. This outline is consistent with 
Amsden’s [1989] account of the flows associated with industrial policy in South Korea and 
is in its main features corroborated by a number of subsequent observers [Kim & Ma 
1997]. The main features of the state-society transfers taking place were first the transfer of 
large subsidies from the state to emerging capitalists. These are shown by the arrows from 
different sets of patrons in the bureaucratic apparatus to specific clients in the industrial 
sector. We now also know that there were in exchange substantial kickbacks from these 
favoured industrial groups to the political leadership as rents from the growing industrial 
sector were re-distributed to the political leadership and through this route to bureaucrats as 
well [Kong 1996]. The revelations of the last two years suggest that part of these rents were 
later distributed in a relatively orderly  fashion down the higher levels of the political and 
bureaucratic hierarchies.  
 
The centralised rent collection and distribution of industrial rents by the peak political leaders 
created powerful incentives to allocate and create rights in ways which maximised these 
rents over time. Rents are maximised over time if growth is maximised. This is simply saying 
that the economic ability of investors to pay bribes is proportional to the productivity of the 
investor. Recalling the factors considered in Section 2, in the absence of a short time horizon 
or other constraints on allocation, even politicians or officials who are merely concerned with 
maximising bribes over time will allocate rights or subsidies in such a way as to maximise 
growth. This involves making sure that the most productive entrepreneurs are favoured and 
the less productive ones are weeded out. The top politician in the South Korean state was 
able to operate in this way because the political bargaining power of unrelated individuals to 
bargain for payoffs was virtually absent during a critical phase of the country’s development 
when key property rights were being established and developmental resources were being 
allocated for rapid industrialisation [Woo-Cumings 1997]. The absence of a powerful 
intermediate class which could demand payoffs from the state at this critical stage of 
industrialisation can in turn be traced to Korea’s social history and the nature of the 
Japanese colonial impact which prevented these classes from developing or consolidating 
[Kohli 1994]. 
 
iii) Malaysia. The South-East Asian countries provide interesting intermediate cases. Unlike 
South Korea and Taiwan with their fairly exceptional social structures formed under the 
Japanese colonial impact [Kohli 1994], the South East Asian countries were closer to the 
South Asian pattern. Although less powerful and entrenched than in the Indian 
sub-continent, emergent middle classes in these countries possessed a greater ability to 
organise political opposition and thereby demand political payoffs compared to their North 
Asian counterparts. The political and institutional responses in these South East Asian 
countries show a wide range of variation in terms of the patterns of political side-payments 
organised to maintain political viability. Malaysia and Thailand provide two interesting 
contrasts to the South Asian case. In both these countries political payoffs and corruption 
were very important but did not prevent rapid accumulation and growth. 
 
Malaysia inherited an ethnic problem which could have spelt disaster. In the sixties it 
possessed an enterprising capitalist sector based on small scale trade and production but this 
sector was dominated by ethnic Chinese capitalists. An emerging Malay middle class was 
increasingly willing to use its political muscle to organise the Malay majority to get a larger 
share of the pie for itself. Luckily for Malaysia, the co-incidence of ethnic identities with 
class ones to some extent helped the organisation of political payoffs in a centralised way. 
The orderly solution to the legitimation problem emerged as an unintended consequence of 
the 1969 riots and the adoption of the New Economic Policy. The political bargain between 
patrons in the state and politically powerful claimants for resources was resolved through 
centralising the demands of the emerging Malay middle classes in an ethnically aligned 
political system. This allowed the state to organise political transfers centrally without 
constructing decentralised and interlocked exchanges between competing groups of political 
factions, their intermediate group clients and particular subsets of capitalists. The de-linking 
of political payoffs from economic corruption allowed in turn a greater degree of rationality 
in the allocation of subsidies and the protection of capitalist property rights than was possible 
in the Indian subcontinent [Khan 1997, Jomo & Gomez 1997]. 
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Figure 4 Flows within Patron-Client Networks in Malaysia 
 
The characteristic features of the economic flows between patrons and clients in post-1969 
Malaysia are shown in Figure 4. The most important transfers are shown in the arrow from 
the (largely) Chinese capitalists to the political leadership of the Malay party UMNO which 
dominated the political system. These transfers included both taxes and illegal extractions. 
The rents extracted were then centrally distributed through the political apparatus to the non-
capitalist clients of UMNO shown by the arrows cascading down the political apparatus to 
non-capitalist clients. In return domestic capitalists received protection and increasingly, 
assistance for moving into high technology industries through the provision of good 
infrastructure and the negotiation of backward linkages between the state and the 
multinationals operating in Malaysia. These quid pro quo payoffs to Malaysia’s capitalists 
were typically not large explicit subsidies (as in South Korea) but they were nevertheless of 
economic significance and are shown in Figure 4 by the arrows from the bureaucracy to 
capitalists. The distinctiveness of this system compared to the South Asian system was that 
rent extraction from the Chinese capitalists was centralised and initially at least, direct links 
between particular capitalists and political factions in the Indian manner did not exist. This 
has changed to some extent over time as the Malaysian economy has grown and with it the 
political power of competing Malay factions within UMNO. But the picture sketched above 
is reasonably accurate for the late sixties and early seventies when Malaysia began its 
economic takeoff. 
 
One feature which distinguishes Malaysia from the South Asian countries and partly explains 
why Malaysia’s clientelist politics was able to coexist with a more dynamic and competitive 
capitalist sector is that country’s vast resource wealth. This allowed the distribution of 
political payoffs to the emerging Malay middle class on a big enough scale to keep them 
satisfied. It is doubtful whether the small productive sector in any of the post-colonial South 
Asian countries could have transferred rents to the state for centralised distribution on a 
scale which would have satisfied all the demands being made. On the other hand, the bi-
polar ethnic dimension of the conflict in Malaysia helped rather than hindered the 
construction of an efficient solution to the clientelist problem. It allowed the construction of a 
fairly explicit and centralised “tax” system which taxed capitalists for the benefit of emerging 
intermediate groups. The language of ethnic deprivation allowed a high proportion of these 
exactions to be legitimised and therefore organised through centralised and legal party and 
state structures without secret deals and personalised bargains. This is consistent with the 
observation that Malaysia is the least corrupt of the group of countries shown in Table 1 
according to subjective corruption indices. A non-ethnic and purely welfarist argument for 
transfers would not have been equivalent because it would have required that the bulk of the 
transfers went to the poorest groups in Malaysia and not necessarily to the leading factions 
of the intermediate classes who had the greatest political power. Given this problem facing a 
purely welfarist argument, it is difficult to imagine an equivalent ideology in India which could 
have served to justify a similar centralised transfer from capitalists to the leaders of India’s 
contesting and diverse intermediate groups.  
 
The accommodation of the Malay intermediate classes through the centralised collection and 
distribution of rents prevented the build-up of dense localised networks of exchanges 
between patrons and clients along the Indian pattern. This in turn allowed the structure of 
rights and subsidies allocated by the state to remain relatively fluid and allowed structural 
change without insuperable resistance being offered by large collections of localised 
intermediate groups. This fluidity has undoubtedly decreased somewhat over time as factions 
of intermediate groups within UMNO have become more powerful over time and have 
established decentralised alliances with large Chinese capitalist groups [Jomo & Gomez 
1997]. Secondly, by satisfying the Malay intermediate classes through rent transfers from 
Malaysian Chinese capitalists and by deploying natural resource rents, the Malaysian state 
could offer multinationals locating in the country a credible level of security for property 
rights and profits which was untypical by developing country standards. This too proved to 
be of great importance in encouraging relatively high-technology firms to locate in Malaysia 
in the seventies and late eighties and engage in backward linkages with Malaysian firms.  
 
iv) Thailand. In contrast to Malaysia, the Chinese capitalists of Thailand were much more 
ethnically integrated with the Thai middle class. The Malaysian pattern of patron-client 
exchanges which separated political from economic exchanges along ethnic lines could not 
therefore emerge in Thailand. Thailand was also different from all the countries discussed so 
far in not having experienced direct colonial occupation and rule. The absence of anti-
colonial mobilisations explains why the political leadership of its emerging intermediate 
classes appears to have been weaker compared to the Indian subcontinent or even 
Malaysia. On the other hand, its intermediate classes were not as atomised as they were in 
South Korea which was subjected to Japanese colonial strategies. Unlike South Korea 
where Japanese land reform displaced rural power blocs, Thailand had powerful networks 
of rural politicians who had to be accommodated at a much earlier stage of development. 
Thus despite its differences with India, it is quite possible that decentralised networks of 
patronage may have developed in Thailand to meet the political demands of powerful and 
largely rural clients. Instead, over the last twenty years Thailand seems to have witnessed a 
gradual taking over of localised political networks by local capitalists.  
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Figure 5 Flows within Patron-Client Networks in Thailand 
 
 
The key arrows in Figure 5 are the ones showing transfers from capitalists to political 
factions which allowed many Thai capitalists (almost uniquely in the Asian development 
context) to take over and run their own political factions. Thailand has the highest number of 
businessmen in parliament in the region [Sidel 1996]. The most important feature 
distinguishing the Thai political system has been the ability and willingness of its capitalists to 
buy their own political factions. Control over their own factions has not only given Thai 
capitalists places in parliament. It has also given them the political power to directly gain 
access to favoured subsidies and the allocation of rights, for instance in the form of 
franchises and licenses [Doner & Ramsay 1997]. Uniquely perhaps in Asia, the political 
power of Thai capitalists frequently places them in the position of patrons within their own 
patron-client networks. While Thai capitalists like their counterparts in the other Asian 
countries have had to make transfers to the political system as part of the maintenance cost 
of their property rights, their payoffs were managed by the “private” political networks 
which they controlled.  
 
The Thai pattern of patron-client exchanges (both legal and illegal) has also had identifiable 
and important effects in Thailand. The fact that Thai capitalists have been directly involved in 
the protection of their property rights meant that resources were not centrally controlled or 
allocated by the state to quite the same extent as in the other countries. As a result Thai 
capitalism has been based on the acquisition of relatively small scale technology with 
property rights over these assets being protected in a decentralised way by this type of 
political corruption and patron-client exchanges.  
 
The number of capitalists going into the political fray in Thailand has also been large, a result 
of a long history of accumulation by small-scale immigrant Chinese traders many of whom 
became extremely wealthy over a long period of time. This has ensured vigorous political 
competition between capitalists for the spoils of power which has prevented the political 
system from being monopolised by any particular capitalist faction. Instead there has been 
vigorous competition for entry into markets through political competition between competing 
factions in the parliament and the bureaucracy. Though the political costs of this competition 
have been high in the form of rampant corruption and political instability, the long-run 
economic performance of Thailand has been relatively better than that of its South Asian 
neighbours. If political stability does not collapse entirely, long run economic growth may 
eventually make it possible to attenuate the worst effects of Thai political corruption through 
constitutional and political reforms. 
 
 
Conclusions  
The proposition discussed in this paper has been that the existence and effects of corruption 
cannot be properly studied outside the context of capitalist accumulation and the political 
contests which it faces from other emerging classes in the surrounding social milieu. 
Economists have typically examined the economic incentives promoting corruption while 
leaving to political scientists the task of analysing its political roots. This paper argues that the 
forms of economic corruption and their effects are closely tied to the forms of political 
corruption. This approach raises fundamental dilemmas for policy approaches to corruption. 
The public face of corruption is clearly unacceptable and in the long run it may destroy the 
limited legitimacy of some developing country states. On the other hand, the visible face of 
corruption is often an integral part of processes of accumulation and social compromise 
which are no less ugly in themselves.  
 
Capitalist accumulation in its early phases creates new classes of privileged property holders 
whose justifiable claim to be in this position instead of many other potential contenders may 
be very limited. The contests they face from emerging middle classes may be difficult to deal 
with other than through political side-payments. These side-payments are in turn difficult to 
organise publicly and from funds which are open to public scrutiny except to a limited extent 
in rare cases such as Malaysia where a convenient legitimising ideology for such transfers 
can emerge. This is because while the demands of the intermediate classes may be perfectly 
understandable and may occasionally be considered legitimate, they may nevertheless be 
difficult to justify on welfare grounds in the face of widespread and much more serious 
poverty. Yet payoffs to some members of these classes may be a necessary part of the 
social compromise through which the process of transition is negotiated. Thus corruption of 
different types may emerge in these contexts as part of a range of exchanges which makes 
these systems work despite the obvious economic costs which we can identify by looking at 
parts of the system in isolation.  
 
Drawing the line between “acceptable” types of accumulation in early capitalism and 
“unacceptable” types is never going to be easy. The more interesting question is to 
distinguish between situations where corruption has impoverishing effects from those where 
corruption allows rapid growth. We have argued that there are good reasons why 
corruption in South Korea may not have been that damaging for growth. While there may be 
other reasons for South Korea’s performance as well, our argument suggest that we do not 
need to rely entirely on these compensating factors to explain why this economy performed 
well despite the presence of substantial corruption. In fact a fair amount of corruption was 
involved during the transitional phases of all countries. The real issue is why the transition 
process is blocked in some developing countries as in South Asia. Here we have argued that 
the patterns of corruption may be integrally implicated which are in turn determined by the 
distribution of power between the state, capitalists and intermediate classes. The economic 
(as opposed to moral) problem is not corruption per se but the political structures which 
generate growth-retarding corruption. This analysis suggests that anti-corruption strategies 
which are concerned with the possible effects of corruption on development have to 
explicitly identify the underlying political problems. If corruption is politically generated and if 
the political structure of societies determines the economic effects of the ensuing corruption, 
in countries where development is blocked the only long run solution may be to provoke a 
sustained public discussion of such arguments so that new political arrangements can 
eventually be constructed.  
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